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Introduction
Theft, drunk driving, and murder are all firmly accepted as wrong or as impermissible
actions, but how to respond to wrong or impermissible actions is still debated. What is justice
and how to achieve it in the face of crime and tragedy is a very old issue--the perfect solution is
unlikely to be found within these pages. This paper will attempt to shed light on the strengths and
weaknesses of various arguments as well as evaluate what is the most just response to crime. In
particular, is a retributive system that punishes crime or a restorative system that heals more just?
Choices abound in modern society. This choice, how we ought to respond to crime, is a very
important one that is best encountered with an informed perspective. Each argument has
strengths that are compelling. Therefore, it is within the best interests of those who desire a just
society, those who are tasked with pursuing justice, and those who may find themselves at the
hands of justice to discover what truly is the just response to crime.
In the realm of criminal justice, Western society has primarily relied on retributive justice
system. A retributive system uses punishment as the standard response to crime for a variety of
reasons such as deterring future crime and because those who commit crime deserve to be
punished. Nevertheless, retributive frameworks are not the only frameworks that are used to
pursue justice. In recent years, some have formulated a different criminal justice system, that of
restorative justice. Restorative justice does not see punishment as the adequate or appropriate
response to crime.1 Rather than punishment, restorative justice proponents argue that justice is
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While it is possible that some may understand the process of how restorative justice holds offenders accountable to
involve or be punishment, these processes, which will be described later, are seen not as punishments inflicted on an
offender, but actions taken willingly by an offender to make amends.
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achieved in the aftermath of crime by healing the trauma incurred by crime. A look at the
Western justice system is informative in understanding the motivations of restorative justice
proponents, as restorative justice was created in response to what is viewed as an unjust system.
If one were to go into any Western criminal courtroom, what they would hear would be
cases referred to as “the state vs the offender.” These, the state and the offender, are the two
primary players in Western criminal justice.2 The process of this criminal justice system further
emphasizes this point; the offender is found to be guilty or not guilty, the appropriate punishment
is doled out to the offender, and the offender is either removed from the system or the process
continues. While this grossly simplifies a very complex system, the general pieces are there. The
offender has been found, convicted, sentenced, and lives out that sentence. Justice has been done.
But proponents of restorative justice believe that justice has not been achieved. To take an
example, a man assaults someone. The victim is beaten, terrified of going out alone,
disempowered, and alienated from their community, friends, and family who do not want to hear
the details of the assault, and who tell the victim to move on. Once again entering the courtroom,
we hear the case called: “the state vs the offender.” The offender is charged with assault and
battery. The victim is brought to the stand and gives a retelling of the assault. The offender is
convicted and sentenced. The offender pays his fine, serves his sentence, does any other
punishment deemed necessary, and the process concludes. Besides telling some part of their
story, which may include being verbally attacked by the defense counsel, the victim is left only
with the knowledge that the person who hurt them has subsequently been hurt as well. But is that
truly a just resolution of this situation? The victim remains terrified to go out alone,
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This is in contrast to the Western civil system that resolves disputes between two individuals; the civil system does
not use punishment as the primary action, but instead seeks to have one individual make restitution to the other.
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disempowered, and alienated. While they might feel some closure at the offender being
punished, the victim remains hurt. The machine of retributive justice has left them behind.
Restorative justice focuses on the needs and obligations of all those involved in and
affected by crime. For the offender, these are primarily obligations to the victim and community,
but the offender also has a variety of needs in order to reduce the likelihood of reoffending and to
help the offender eventually become a fully functioning member of the community. Most
importantly for restorative justice advocates, and in contrast to what was described above, justice
must acknowledge and address the victim’s needs. The first concern of restorative justice is not
that punishment is wrong, but rather that punishment is an entirely inadequate response to the
reality of the victim’s as well as community's harm and the offenders rehabilitation. Restorative
justice has only recently begun to enter a wider arena of public thought. Despite its youth, there
is value in the restorative path to justice.
The aim of this project is to articulate the value of restorative justice and evaluate its
prospects. Towards that end, the first chapter will be a discussion of what justice requires in the
realm of crime. That is, an understanding of when justice has been achieved, and creating a
standard by which to evaluate systems that attempt to achieve justice. While this will necessarily
be incomplete, retribution and restoration cannot be compared and evaluated without a baseline
notion of justice. The second and third chapters will explore two theories of how to do criminal
justice, retributive and restorative respectively. Finally, the fourth chapter will compare the two
theories of justice to the standard discussed in chapter one, followed by a brief discussion as to
how restorative justice may be implemented. This chapter uses case studies and data to further
confirm the conclusions.
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I: What Is Justice?
Like many old ideas, the problem of justice was confronted by the ancient Greeks; justice
is famously discussed in Plato’s Republic. In the Republic, Socrates speaks at length about what
justice is not. He shows that justice is not merely the paying of debts and giving each what is
due, nor is justice the interest of the stronger, as his opponent Thrasymachus claims. At even
more length, Socrates explains that it is good to be just. These points are understood by society:
justice is more than the interest of the stronger, for a weaker person deserves justice as well.
While some may argue--as Thrasymachus does--that injustice brings larger riches or power, and
that this difference makes injustice better, it seems apparent that most would prefer a system that
benefits just action over unjust action. In Book IV, Socrates defines justice as doing one’s own.
This definition comes about by comparing the polis to a human being. Plato argues that the city
is just when all parts of the city are doing as they ought to be. Similarly, an individual is just
when the parts, and therefore the whole, are doing as they ought to be. This can be summed up as
“doing one’s own.” This idea has come to be very commonly used and broadened in the latin
“suum cuique”--doing one’s own, to each his own, to each what is owed. While this is a working
definition of justice, this definition is not the last to come from the Greek tradition.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle elaborated on Plato’s theory and incorporated his
understanding of character into justice. Aristotle, in his “Virtue Ethics,” argues that justice is a
condition of character. He also distinguishes this general justice from specific justice that is
exemplified differently in different areas of society. Aristotle begins by describing that the
condition, justice, that is being referred to is the condition that allows one to perform just actions.
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This does seem clear, for the only indicator that an agent is just are the actions he or she takes;
one who performs just actions is just, and one who performs unjust actions is unjust. In order to
perform these just actions, one must be enacting the virtues. General justice is the individual
condition of complete virtue. “It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue
not only in himself but towards his neighbour also.”3 Therefore, being of virtuous character is
being just. Furthermore, because justice is a state, Aristotle says that it can be studied by looking
at its opposites.4 Aristotle describes unjust action to be both unfair and unlawful, by which he
means that just action must include fairness and lawfulness. Aristotle defends that position by
arguing that the law promotes the virtues and prohibits vices. With the law and the virtues
connected, Aristotle then connects observing the law and being just, for to act against the law is
equally to act against the virtues, which would mean being unjust. Justice also requires fairness.
As an unjust person will reflect the vices, this person will have the vice of greed. Like all vices,
greed does not exist in moderation--one may either have an excess of greed or be deficient of
greed. Greed means that one takes more than one’s share of good things and less of one’s share
of bad things, which is unfair. Having proven that enacting vice means to be unfair, Aristotle has
shown that being unfair is also to be unjust. Therefore, to be just is also to be fair.
These qualities of justice do seem good, but they raise practical issues. Foremost among
these is the problem of “proper” law. It is hopefully true that all law aims to promote virtuous
action and either prohibit or disincentivize vice, however it is unlikely to be the case. Is it just to
follow a law that promotes vice? Aristotle states that “the correctly established law does this
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Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1999.
Section 5.1.
4
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. 5.1.
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[promote virtue] correctly, and the less carefully framed one does this worse.”5 While Aristotle
does acknowledge the existence of improper law, he neither acknowledges truly unjust law,
which does not aim to promote virtue, nor advises on what to do when confronted with such a
law. It seems that the reader of Aristotle is left to fall back on their virtues, and continue to enact
personal virtue in the face of unjust law, for to enact the virtues is to be just. If the law promotes
the enactment of virtue then it is just to be lawful, but if the law promotes vice, then it may be
just to go against the law.
A further problem of this definition of justice as lawfulness is that it may not apply to a
more libertarian society. For Aristotle, laws were directly concerned with the character of the
citizens, but this is not perfectly the case in the modern Western world. The laws of the United
States are primarily based around a conception of negative liberty, which prevents citizens from
infringing on the rights of others; while this may in part prohibit vice, it does not promote virtue.
A law against the formation of monopolies may prevent one from enacting an excess of greed,
but it does little to nothing to promote the virtue of temperance. It follows from this that if
modern liberal laws are not concerned with virtue, then a just person also need not be concerned
with liberal laws. Nevertheless, lawfulness is only one descriptor of justice given by Aristotle,
and justice as a state of character continues to be essential to his definition.
The final problem is the issue of a just state. If justice is defined as a condition of
character in which one is able to perform just actions through enacting the whole of virtue, then
it seems as though one would not be able to describe a state or government as just or unjust,
since it does not possess character virtues. This was actually answered by Socrates in his
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conception of justice as harmony within the soul by showing that harmony within a republic
yields a truly just state. This thought is easily applied to Aristotle’s definition, for the virtues
revolve primarily around the avoidance of extremes. A state or government would then be
virtuous in the same way that a person is virtuous. A person is virtuous by making a habit of
enacting the mean between extremes within actions, and the same can be said about a
government. A government that is unbalanced in any category can be identified as not virtuous
and unjust--for instance, a government that is either too quick or too slow to violence can be
characterized as having the vices of rashness or cowardice. Of course, the language of individual
character virtues do not describe a government perfectly, but that a government can be virtuous
and therefore judged as to its justice does seem true.
By looking at Plato’s and Aristotle’s definitions of justice, we can ascertain a working
definition of general justice. This justice would then be what the various kinds of justice aim
towards: theories of distributive justice aims to achieve broad justice in the social realm of
goods, and retributive, (or more broadly, “rectificatory”) justice aims to achieve broad justice in
the criminal realm. General justice is a state of virtue that in some way comes from a harmony of
parts--harmony of the parts of the self as Socrates argued, or harmony of the virtues as Aristotle
argues. It is a state which is noticeable by the performance of just actions befiting the specifics of
that person, as Plato said to “do one’s own.” To be just is also to follow the law, so long as the
law is one that promotes virtue. Likewise, to be just requires being fair because an unfair person
is not a virtuous person.
With an understanding of justice as a general individual goal, it is necessary to outline the
specifics of criminal justice, or the realm of rectificatory justice. By rectification, Aristotle refers
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to actions taken by judges after someone has been harmed.6 Clearly, rectificatory justice and
criminal justice are part of the same realm. I will use the term “rectificatory justice” not as a
specific model for achieving justice, such as retributive justice or restorative justice, but rather as
the term for how justice is to be understood in the criminal justice realm. Aristotle’s description
of rectificatory justice can thus be used as context for and a standard against which retributive
and restorative justice can be judged.
Aristotle states that rectificatory justice “involves numerical proportion and equality.”7
This is to say that crime and harm necessarily involves someone who gains and someone who
loses. The simplest example of this is theft, for the thief gains in proportion to what the victim
loses. As he himself acknowledges, Aristotle’s use of loss and profit to describe all crime is
problematic. At base in all crime there is an existing inequality: whoever has been assaulted has
suffered more than the one who assaulted. In this sense, profit is seen as to be on the positive side
of the inequality after harm is done, and loss is to be on the negative side of the inequality. This
understanding of profit and loss is fitting for all crimes, for one party is naturally harmed and the
other naturally is not. Therefore, the injustice involved herein is an unjust inequality created by
crime or harm. It follows that justice will be the rectification of that unjust inequality, which will
be the establishment of equality among those involved with respect to the unjust act. This is not
to say that justice in rectification necessitates that those involved be brought to a perfectly equal
condition, but only that the unjust inequality that was created by an unjust act be rectified.
Aristotle’s metric of the intermediate condition is the essential requirement for
rectificatory justice. In order to find the intermediate between profit and loss in crime, one must

6
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first find the states of profit and loss. The effects of a crime have two dimensions, the internal
and the external. The internal effects for a victim of crime are fear, the feeling of isolation, the
loss of autonomy, and other like harms. External effects of crime are effects that are manifest
external to the mental such as structural damage to property and bodily harm among other
effects. The effects listed here are what Aristotle would describe as losses, and while many of
them have corresponding profits for the offender, some may appear to achieve no profit for an
offender. For instance, there is no readily discernible profit for a murderer unless he does so to
further another cause. Aristotle says that the words ‘profit’ and ‘loss’ are used to describe
unequally divided suffering.8 Loss then is the larger amount of suffering that is the victim’s, and
profit is the smaller amount of suffering that is the offender’s. Suffering caused by crime has
many manifestations both internal and external, subjective and objective, and all aspects must be
accounted for. The object of rectificatory justice is then to ensure that those involved have
neither a profit nor a loss, which will be the middle point between the incurred suffering of the
crime.
As profit is the condition of having more pleasure or less suffering than deserved, and
loss is profits opposite; the intermediate condition can be therefore described as the correct
amount of pleasure and suffering, which Aristotle advises ought to be numerically equal among
participants.9 Further, justice does not treat the decent person differently than the base person
regardless of who profited or lost due to the harm; Aristotle implies by this that profit and loss
are a zero sum game because only the inequality incurred is dealt with by adding and subtracting
within a closed system, and that there exists a condition of having “precisely what belongs to
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them.”10 An important note is that this process does not involve previous inequalities between the
victim and offender. All that is taken into account is the suffering that the crime has caused.
In the example of crime, Aristotle says that equality is found by subtracting from the
offender half the difference between the profit and the loss incurred from the unjust action, and
then giving that value to the victim. This is what Aristotle describes as equality. “What is just in
rectification is what is intermediate between loss and profit.”11 Which is to say that, in the
example of theft, that what has been stolen is returned and thus the offender and victim are
returned to their precrime state without profit or loss. Aristotle states that if a victim is at -X and
an offender is at +X, then that the half of the difference, X, ought to be subtracted from the
offender and added to the victim, which would bring both to zero. This definition or goal of
rectificatory justice both seems reasonable and to match a common understanding of criminal
justice. Injustice, in this case crime, imposes unjust inequality, and the judicial process is the
process that rules on the extent of a specific inequality and what actions will restore the equality.
This definition allows for not only material loss to be accounted for, but also can account for the
emotional harm incurred by crime, which modern criminal justice does try do. Nevertheless,
there are a number of possible critiques of justice as equality, two of which will be discussed
here.
When a person commits a crime, it is possible that they lose some of their rights. Put
more plainly, the question to be raised against this definition is, “does a criminal deserve
equality?” When a crime is committed, the offender infringes and inhibits the rights of the
victim. For instance, a theft is similar to the loss of the right to property. Likewise, the offender

10
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ought to lose some or all of their rights, for they took the rights of the victim; this is one
formulation of Lex Talionis, a core idea of retributive justice that will be explained in the
following chapter. While such an argument still pursues equality, it believes that equality
necessitates the offender losing their rights because that is what happened to the victim.
Nevertheless, this approach cannot achieve justice in rectification as defined by Aristotle.
Aristotle defines equality as the intermediate between loss and profit, and in this argument,
equality is seen as subtracting the entire difference from the offender. This would mean that
when a thief stole X dollars, the full 2X dollar difference between the offender and victim would
be subtracted from the offender, leaving the offender at a loss. Neither if the victim is brought to
profit and the offender left at loss, nor if either the victim and the offender end at a loss is justice
in rectification achieved.
A second argument against criminals having a right to the equality described by Aristotle
is that they have willfully left the bounds of society, which is the body that gives rights to
individuals. Now that they exist outside of society, the rules of society no longer apply, and they
have thus forfeited the right to equality.
There are two responses to this issue. The first is on the basis of the process for criminals
re-entering society. If criminals are to be punished, rehabilitated, socialized, restored, or any such
process of justice before being brought back into society, then they are not outside the bounds of
society, or are no longer outside such bounds. Furthermore, it seems true that in order to be a part
of a society, one must have the basic rights of society, which includes equality before the law.
Therefore, a justice system that includes an avenue for criminals to rejoin society must give
criminals equality before they return to the larger community. However, it is true that some
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crimes and some criminals do not have avenues open for rejoining society--e.g. those with life
sentences, or those in earlier times who were banished from their society--, and even the
language of “rejoining” and “re-entering” imply that the criminal at some point is outside of
society. For while the criminal is being acted upon by the justice system, they necessarily lose
some of their rights, such as the right to live as they choose. However, so long as there is a goal
of rejoining society, a criminal is entitled eventual equality.
The other response to the second issue rests on Aristotle’s definition of justice. The above
speaks about what the criminal deserves, but that question need not be asked. All agree that the
pursuit of justice is good and ought to be done, and as shown above, justice in the realm of
rectification is pursued and achieved through a kind of equality. This means that the criminal
deserves equality based on no merit of their own, but the criminal must have this kind of equality
based on the demands of justice. A just system would then be one that rectifies unjust inequality
into just equality. Aristotle states that, “The law looks only at the differences in the harm
inflicted, and treats the people involved as equals.”12 Both victim and criminal, regardless of their
position within or without society ought to be treated as equals before the law. Except, of course,
Aristotle holds that unequals must be treated unequally, for to treat a child like an adult or an
adult like a child is unjust. There are echos of Aristotle’s understanding of general justice as
virtue in this argument, for the law can be judged virtuous based on its action. A virtuous law is
not a vindictive law but a fair law. Therefore, a just law is a fair law as well.
Aristotle gives a theory of justice in rectification that is informed by but separate from his
understanding of the personal quality of justice. This theory, that justice is the intermediate
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between profit and loss, allows us to evaluate methods of justice; a strong theory for how justice
ought to be pursued will fulfill the conditions laid out by Aristotle.

II: Retributive Justice
Almost as long as human beings have sought justice, they have employed retribution.
One of the earliest sources of retributive justice can be found in the book of Leviticus chapter 24
lines 17-22. “Anyone who injures his neighbor will get back the same as he gave: fracture for
fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth. This passage refers to the so called “lex talionis” conception
of retributive justice; those that commit a crime will be punished in proportion to the crime they
committed. This is to say that the offender will always be harmed no more and no less than what
is proportional to the crime in response. It is sometimes, but never consistently, taken literally;
some interpretations read that punishment must be identical to the exact crime committed, but
this law only requires proportionality. Justice does not require that all rapists be raped, and a man
who has murdered two people cannot be put to death twice. Furthermore, lex talionis implies
consistency. The law does not allow for inconsistency in punishment because each crime is
always responded to proportionally. Should one of these requirements, proportionality and
consistency, be broken the other would be lost as well. In order to compare restorative justice to
retributive justice, we must first find an adequate conception of and justification for retributive
justice. The core conception of retributive justice we will use is lex talionis, the law of
retribution, understood in terms of proportionality and consistency of punishment. Therefore the
question at hand is which motivations and justifications used in retributive theory best motivate
and justify retributive justice as seen through lex talionis. For the purpose of this chapter three
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such arguments will be discussed. The first will be the emotional motivation for retribution,
which says that punishment is just because people feel negative emotions, like revenge, due to
crime, and those emotions ought to be acted upon. Emotion will be found to be an inadequate
motivation for retributive justice. Secondly, the deterrence justification will also be discussed.
Deterrence, related to consequentialist ethical theory, says that punishment is just because of the
consequences, namely that crime is deterred through punishing criminals. Deterrence will also be
shown to be an inadequate justification for retributive justice. Finally, the Kantian deontological
justification for retributive justice, which argues that punishment is right and obligatory in itself
rather than because of its motivations or consequences, will be discussed. This, it will be argued,
is the strongest philosophical justification for retributive justice.

Revenge
The lex talionis understanding of retribution has frequently been interpreted as the law of
emotional revenge. It can appear that this law is the vocalization of humanity’s desire for
violence in response to violence. However the eye for an eye law cannot be just a prescription for
emotional revenge but rational retribution. Revenge is motivated by negative emotions such as
anger, hate, remorse, or rage, which are brought into life via crime. Rather than merely satisfying
emotion, a just retribution would have to be governed by the rational rules of proportionality and
consistency, as described above. To take an example, a man’s wife is murdered, he feels the urge
to kill the murderer, and he does so; this is clearly emotion motivated revenge. In contrast,
imagine the community has a consistently enforced law that all murders are executed because
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death is the proportional punishment to murder, and the murderer is executed. Rather than merely
emotional revenge, this is lex talionis and retributive justice.
Nevertheless, some may still believe emotional revenge to be a reasonable justification
for retributive justice because both the rational and emotional cases above lead to the same
outcome. This belief focuses on the proportionality requirement of lex talionis that deals with the
outcome of retributive justice, but forgets to consider how consistent emotional revenge will be.
If emotion decides the outcome of justice, then it is possible that murders will go unpunished
because no one feels motivated to retaliate. This is to say that the emotions felt by the victims of
crime and third parties are not consistent, so punishment based on that emotion will be
inconsistent. Equally possible is that lesser crimes will be disproportionately punished; if
emotion rules justice, then victims of theft may decide to kill the offender. When the onus of
deciding punishment is put on the feelings of victims, inconsistencies will exist between
punishment. These inconsistencies inevitably result in disproportionate punishments.13 A
rationally just version of lex talionis cannot be motivated solely by the emotion of victims, and
therefore neither can retributive justice.

Deterrence
A second justification of retributive justice is deterrence. The law of deterrence says that
punishment is just because it deters future crimes from happening. This means that crimes ought
to be punished insofar and to the extent as the punishment will deter future crime. Deterrence
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Brettschneider, Corey. Punishment, Property and Justice: Philosophical Foundations of the Death Penalty and
Welfare Controversies. Aldershot (Gran Bretaña): Ashgate, 2004. Pages: 18-19
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theory argues that the existence of punishment deters initial offense as well as recidivism. This
belief has many supporters and critics, but for the purpose of understanding a retributive
justification based on deterrence let us assume it to be true, and turn to how well deterrence
follows the requirements of the rationally just version of lex talionis that have been set out as the
core of retributive justice.
The deterrence justification of retributive justice states that punishment is just because it
prevents crime by punishing criminals for their actions. This seems to be an improvement on the
revenge justification, for there is a rational system for deciding the punishment of an offender;
this rational system seems to avoid the issue of inconsistency and disproportionality.
Furthermore, “the general deterrence theory does not encourage the populace to fixate on the
horror of the crime but provides them with a constructive response to it..”14 Deterrence has a
rational basis for punishment and may well improve society. It therefore may then be supported
by a Utilitarian moral theory, in which those actions are right for which the consequences
optimize social welfare.
Unfortunately, deterrence does not function as well for lex talionis. Because deterrence
uses the consequences of punishment as justification, deterrence is equally as inconsistent as a
revenge-based system. If a respected agent, who is depended upon by society, is accused of
stealing, then his community may distrust this accusation and react negatively to any
punishment, or decide that punishment is unnecessary. This means that the punishment will
likely serve to increase social unrest. Because of this, deterrence may say that the agent ought not
to be punished in order to deter further crime, or the agent will merely be lightly punished.

14

Brettschneider. Punishment and Property. 23.

Silberstein 17

However, if a disliked agent commits the same crime, there will be a societal call to punish this
man, and the law of deterrence will do so. By basing the justification on the effect deterrence has
on society, deterrence based punishment becomes inconsistent because otherwise equivalent
crimes may be understood differently by society.15 Deterrence based punishment also
inadvertently places great worth on the momentary feelings of citizens about a crime, for how
people will feel about the punishment affects how they will be deterred or motivated.
Deterrence based punishment will also fail to be proportional to the crime because it will
over punish or under punish. Under a system of deterrence, the law may find that the most
effective way to deter theft is to amputate a hand of the thief. While this may indeed be the best
way to prevent theft, it does not adhere to the proportionality requirement of lex talionis. This
disproportionality can swing in the other direction as well, as if no way of deterring a crime
exists, then there is no need to punish that crime; if it is impossible to create a punishment
capable of deterring people from committing murder, then there is no justification to punish
murderers. This would be clearly unjust because of the disproportion between the crime and
punishment. Of course, these examples are exaggerated, and a consequential judicial system
would likely take into account multiple consequences through which the unreasonable examples
given above would likely be avoided. Nevertheless, what is being shown here is that a retributive
system cannot be adequately justified or governed by deterrence alone because it will fail to be
fully proportional and consistent. Deterrence may still exist as a positive byproduct of retributive
justice.

15
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In short, retributive justice cannot be justified on either the emotion of revenge or desire
for deterrence because neither aligns with retributive justice’s requirements for consistency and
proportionality. Retributive justice requires a justification all the same. We may note that while
restorative justice and retributive justice disagree, they have something in common. Restorative
justice relies on an understanding of harm as bad and healing harm as good and is motivated by
the desire to do good. This is somewhat mirrored in retributive justice; retributive justice
understands that crime is wrong and that consistent and proportional punishment is the good and
appropriate response to crime. We will see that Kantian deontology gives an account of that
understanding.

Kantian Punishment
In the first part of Immanuel Kant’s 1796 The Metaphysics of Morals, is his Philosophy of
Law, where Kant describes the requirements for punishment. “But what is the mode and measure
of punishment which public Justice takes as its principle and standard? It is just the principle of
equality…”16 Kant agrees with the law of lex talionis. Punishment is ruled and decided by
equivalence; an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Again, this is not identical punishment,
but rather proportional punishment. This also implies that Kant’s theory of punishment and a
deontological justification of retributive justice will not rely on revenge or deterrence, as those
justifications do not provide proportional outcomes. In order to explore Kantian retributive
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justice, a preliminary understanding of his deontological ethics is required. With that in hand, we
will turn to the essential question of “can it be morally justified to punish and inflict harm?” How
one answers this question will lead to either a strong defense or critique of retributive justice.
Kant’s deontology prescribes one moral law, which Kant refers to as the categorical
imperative in his 1785 publication Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. “The categorical
imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary in itself, without
reference to another end.”17 Kant says that following the categorical imperative is the basis of
moral action, and moral actors use rationality to ascertain what is and is not a duty, for “in it [a
rational being], and in it alone, would there be the ground of a possible categorical imperative,
i.e., of a practical law.”18 Kant understands rationality to be valuable, and that rationality is
capable of finding practical moral laws.
Two formulations of the categorical imperative, the universal law formulation and the
humanity formulation will be reviewed. The universal law formulation first dictates that moral
actions must be universalizable. Indeed, Kant explains that universalizable maxims are not
categorical imperatives, but rather that “there is only one categorical imperative.. Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law.”19 To do this, a maxim or law is formulated, such as “lie to acquire what you need.” The
moral actor tries universalizes the maxim by imagining a theoretical world where the law is
followed universally, and the moral actor evaluates the theoretical world on its ability to exist
and whether it is willable by a rational agent. In this case, the theoretical world would be self
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defeating; if everyone in the world would lie regularly, then “no one would believe what was
promised him but would merely laugh at all such utterances as being vain pretenses.”20 This
formulation of the categorical imperative shows that when the moral actor tries to universalize
the maxim, they can rationally comprehend whether it is morally right.
Kant also explains a second formulation of the categorical imperative. This formulation
finds the imperative to be, “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a
means.”21 This is to say that because humanity is rational and therefore valuable in itself, it must
always be treated as valuable; treating rational beings as ends with value to be respected rather
than means to further other ends is the basis of moral action. Using the lying example given
above, one will find the same answer that lying for what one needs is wrong. In this case, the
moral actor ought not to lie because it treats others as means rather than ends. By lying to a
rational human in order to further one’s own ends, one uses another rational human as a means
towards the betterment of the self. This directly contradicts the humanity formulation and is
therefore wrong. For Kant, these two formulations will always give equivalent answers to the
same questions because they are two ways of accessing the single moral law.
Some believe that deontology will define judicial punishment as wrong because
deontology so defines many other forms of harm. Eoin O’Connell argues against this in Kantian
Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest Good. He writes that, “a murder
and an execution may be considered the same as pieces of behavior--the intentional killing of
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another person--but there are different reason for killing in the two cases.”22 The difference being
described is a difference of maxims. O’Connell states that the different intents behind a murder
and an execution separate the two maxims: a criminal maxim that states that crime is permissible
and a punishment maxim that states that crimes will be punished. “Therefore, the non
universalizability of a criminal maxim does not transfer to the punishment maxim.”23 This
understanding of the issue fits with Kant’s ethics because Kant is not interested in consequences
of actions; while the two maxims may result in similar consequences (death), that does not mean
they are the same maxim of moral action. With the separation of the criminal and punishment
maxims, the punishment maxim may be tested on its own. If the punishment maxim were
universalized, all crimes would be punished. This is a universalizable world. This maxim is also
rationally willable because it seems correct that crime must be responded to.
Nevertheless, for punishment to be an acceptable response the critique that the purposeful
infliction of suffering is always wrong must be answered. Starting with the humanity
formulation, intentional harm does not appear to violate the categorical imperative. Intentional
harm is the purposeful infliction of pain, injury, or similar states. Intentional harm covers more
than simple bodily harm, as incarceration certainly seems to be harm. An example of this type of
harm would be a dentist forcing a man to floss. The man will likely feel harmed by this
imposition. However, this action is taken for the sake of the man. More specifically for
deontology, being healthy will support the man’s rationality. Therefore, this is a morally just
action under the humanity formulation.
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The maxim hidden in the flossing example will also pass the test of universalization. This
maxim could be, “one ought to harm if it is done to better the person harmed.” Very similarly to
a maxim of benevolence, this harm acts in order for the betterment of one’s humanity. A world
where this maxim rules is quite willable. Harm is employed as a powerful teaching mechanism
on both adults and children. Society sees harming children as good when it is done for the
betterment of the child; while spanking may be a controversial topic, giving a child a time out or
forcing a child to eat vegetables rather than ice cream, both of which fall under the definition of
harm given above, are seen as acceptable and necessary. Clearly the world of this maxim is not
only conceivable but is also willable. Intentional harm for the betterment of the other is therefore
a morally just action as well as a moral duty. Therefore deontology does not always forbid harm.
Indeed, for Kant the categorical imperative defines punishment as a duty. A retributive
system of punishment follows the humanity formulation because it need not be based on the
consequences of punishment. This system would punish because the humanity of the offender
requires it; Kant would see other justifications and motivations to criminal justice such as
deterrence or emotion as using the offender as a means to another end. In contrast, the retribution
Kant describes is not for any end save that of the criminal’s. Punishment under this conception is
not only for the purpose of harming the wrongdoer. Kant implies that it is beneficial to punish
someone who has committed a crime because they acted immorally by acting against the
categorical imperative--punishment is justified harm being administered, which is morally
necessary and beneficial. Punishing is a moral duty, and failing to is immoral. Kant argues that
“the law of punishment is a categorical imperative.”24 For punishment must happen in order that
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“...blood guilt does not cling to the people for not having insisted upon this punishment; for
otherwise the people can be regarded as collaborators in this public violation of justice.”25 Not
punishing a criminal makes one complicit and collaborator in the crime. Therefore, punishment
is a necessary reaction both because of the moral requirements of the wrongdoer, but also
because of the duty of the punisher. This seems intuitively correct, as not acting to rectify
injustice sustains injustice. Sustaining something unjust would presumably be an immoral action.
Therefore, this system sees the only just response to injustice as punishment.
Kant finds retributive justice to be valuable for itself rather than by its consequences.He
writes that, “Juridical Punishment can never be administered merely as a means of promoting
another Good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases
be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime.”26 As it
was explained above, Kant firmly states that punishment is good in and of itself. retributive
justice is not right because of its consequences, but rather retributive justice is right because
punishing crime is right and necessary.
This sets up the two prerequisites for punishment that Kant defines; the offender “must
first be found to be guilty and punishable..”27 One may only be punished if they are indeed both
guilty and proven to be so. It is not enough simply to be guilty, for the word “found” requires a
process of finding. This means that a judicial system is needed in order to confirm one’s guilt.
Beyond being found guilty, one must be found to be punishable in order to be punished. What
Kant means by punishable is less clear. However, Kant consistently seats value in rationality and
finds punishment to have value because of how it treats rational humans. It is likely that Kant
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means the having a sound mind as a requirement for punishment. Kant has set up an
understanding of retributive justice that is justified by punishment itself and relies on a process to
establish the accused’s guilt and aptness for punishment.
With the duty to punish explained, it is necessary to find how that duty is to be carried
out. It has already been shown that punishment is to be done after a process for finding guilt and
punishability, but the requirements of proportionality and consistency have yet to be explored.
O’Connell asserts that Kantian retribution must be proportional through Kant’s discussion of the
highest good and our duty to promote the highest good. While, for Kant, morality is obligatory
regardless of any good, he does present a notion of the highest good in the his 1788 Critique of
Practical Reason. O’Connell begins by explaining Kant’s highest good, the synthesis of moral
virtue and happiness. He states that “virtue without happiness cannot be considered completely
good. Kant’s point is that while we would consider Job a good person, we would not say he had a
good life.”28 This makes very good sense, as all of a human life must be good for a life to be
considered fully good. Furthermore, “virtue has moral precedence and therefore takes the
antecedent position..”29 This theory does not posit a causal relationship between virtue and
well-being; if it did, it would directly contradict the example of Job because Job was virtuous but
not happy. Rather, Kant’s formulation of the highest good is to be understood as an ideal, where
well being is proportional to virtue. It is right for virtuous people to be happy, and it is wrong for
unvirtuous people to be happy. Nevertheless, it is clearly apparent that Kant’s highest good does
not describe reality. Rather than describing reality, Kant’s highest good is a condition of the ideal
world.
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Kant’s formulation of the ideal life, or highest good, is a morally good and happy life.
Part of understanding moral virtue as part of the highest good is to see the pursuit of moral virtue
to be good. This is somewhat obvious, but important to state, as it means that actively supporting
the connection between virtue and happiness further pursues the highest good. Also, deontology
does not take into account individual contexts, but creates universal imperatives; this imperative
would be to further the positive relationship between virtue and happiness. The inverse of this
would also be true. The highest good would be a world in which virtue corresponds to happiness,
so it follows that lack of virtue ought to correspond with unhappiness. The duty that comes from
this conception of the highest good can be summarized as, “the proper targets of benevolence are
permissible ends, whereas the proper targets for retribution are impermissible actions.”30 Simply
put, a moral actor ought to promote the well being of virtuous people through benevolence and
punish non-virtuous people. O’Connell distinguishes between ends and actions in the above
quote. Because ends and actions are distinguished, one can be treated with benevolence for
desiring a permissible end, while still morally requiring punishment for impermissible action.
The duty to promote the highest good requires that punishment be done proportionally.
Crime is morally wrong, deserves to be punished, and violates the desired relationship of virtue
and happiness; an immoral man might be happy because his crimes make his life very easy by
treating others as means to improve his own ends. Crime may also damage a virtuous victim’s
wellbeing. The Kantian justification for proportional punishment is found through Kant’s
understanding of the highest good. By taking into account both the duty to pursue the highest
good and how crime affects the relationship between virtue and wellbeing, the justification for
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proportional punishment can be established. Punishment ought to be proportional to how a crime
has damaged the relationship between moral virtue and wellbeing.
As noted, Kant establishes that retribution must only be done after one is found guilty and
apt for punished. The justification for both prerequisites of punishment are founded in how
deontology seats value in rational autonomy. Humans have value because of their rationality, and
this applies equally to those that have committed crimes as well as those who have not. This
rational nature, and the value inherent within said nature, demands a process for establishing
guilt. This is to ensure that the person is being treated as an end rather than a mean, for vigilante
justice is both more likely to misplace guilt as well as be motivated by revenge; both situations
disrespect the rational humanity of the person.
The justification for the punishability requirement also rests on rationality. Punishment’s
justification under deontology is that a rational person has a duty to follow the categorical
imperative, and a criminal fails to do so, which necessitates punishment in order to respect the
humanity of the criminal and pursue the highest good. That justification rests on the offender
having rationality. Should the offender not be rational or generally not be of sound mind, then
this justification will not apply to them.
The requirements of guilt, punishability, and proportionality require a judicial process.
Indeed, Kant says that judges or courts are “the moral person that is authorized to impute with
rightful force.”31 While Kant singles out the court system in this quote, it is not any specific type
or model of judge, but rather simply judges that are endowed with authority to judge. This only
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further confirms that there must be an officially designated process and institutional arrangement
for retribution in order to conform to the requirements of moral duty.
Having explored several facets of retributive justice of which some stand and some do
not, brings us to a clarified picture of retributive justice. Beginning with what true retribution is
not makes clear that retributive justice is motivated by a moral duty rather than emotion and the
desire for revenge. Likewise, retributive justice is not justified by the consequences of the
punishments that are given. Rather than consequences, retribution is justified in itself because it
is right to punish crime. The ideas presented above are unlikely to be found shocking; many
people understand crime as wrong and punishment as right without feeling motivated by revenge
or justifying punishment through consequences. Kant justifies a consistent and proportional
notion of retributive justice; while it may create the byproducts of deterrence or satisfy the need
for revenge, this justice treats those as secondary to the duty of punishment.

III: Restorative Justice
Restorative justice is another framework or perspective for understanding issues of
injustice and how society or individuals ought to be treated in order to achieve justice in the
aftermath of crime. It focuses on how best to heal the harm caused by crime. The definition of
justice varies not only between theories but also within them. Nevertheless, restorative justice
has an underlying foundation in an understanding of justice. As restorative justice is a relatively
new field, the best practices fluctuate greatly among proponents.32 Still its sought-after ideal of
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justice is identifiable; restorative justice understands crime to violate relationships and cause
harm. It seeks to restore those harmed by crime.
In 1990, Howard Zehr published a seminal book on restorative justice, Changing Lenses.
In his book, Zehr describes a restorative justice opposed to retributive justice, and while this
contrast is useful for an initial understanding of restorative justice, it is lacking when it comes to
explaining the justifications of the theory. In 2003, Zehr published a follow up to his initial
volume in which he acknowledges the shortcomings of the first and gives an independent
account of restorative justice. Helpfully titled The Little Book of Restorative Justice, this book
refined much of what Zehr stated earlier. In The Little Book of Restorative Justice, Zehr softens
the contrast between the two theories and gives a clear account of what restorative justice is.
Because of this, the second book will be more useful for this project. As Zehr leads us through
the foundational signposts of restorative justice, supplementary authors and readings will add
depth to our understanding.
A useful perspective in understanding restorative justice is put forth by Zehr in a 2000
paper titled A Journey to Belonging. Zehr argues for understanding crime as tragedy. When a
tragedy strikes, it is a traumatic to all those involved. In the context of a crime those involved are
the victim, the offender, and other members of the community, all of which are referred to as
stakeholders.33 Justice then is healing the trauma in those affected, however that may look, that
has occurred. Importantly, the state is not understood as a stakeholder in such trauma, although a
national community may be. This is because restorative justice does not define crime as offense
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against the state, but as “a violation of people and of interpersonal relationships.”34 If the law is
understood as a set of rules put in place to represent and protect relationships then when one
violates a law, they actually violate the web of relationships. So, while crime violates
relationships instead of the government, the law is something in between the two.
This view of tragedy and trauma brings our attention to the internal experience of crime.
Restorative justice does not only focus on the objective facts of crime, for the objective nature is
inadequate in understanding the full extent of the trauma that occurs--the focus is on the total
effect of a crime as opposed to which particular crime was committed. This is because the trauma
that one victim of burglary may feel might not match another burglary victim, but may be similar
to the victim of a hit and run car accident. What matters to restorative justice is healing trauma.35
Once the correct offender has been identified, understanding the objective facts of the crime has
value primarily in how the facts may help to heal trauma, which will be further explored later.
A common misconception about restorative justice is that it is essentially blanket
forgiveness for all offenders and requires victims to forgive offenders. This is not the case. While
facilitating honest forgiveness is viewed as a success in restorative justice, it is not a demand or
requirement. Some believe that by aiming to reintegrate the offender into the community,
restorative justice must forgive offenders, but this process is the same as the retributive process
that releases offenders after they serve their sentence. Neither retribution nor restoration
necessitates offender forgiveness, but in either case when the offender has been held responsible
and accountable, they are, in the vast majority of cases of either system, brought back to the
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community at large. Forgiveness is, for restorative justice, a desirable, but not always achievable
goal.
As alluded to above, restorative justice revolves around the needs and obligations that
arise out of crime. Restorative justice sees that multiple people are involved in a crime and
believes that all these people should be involved in the judicial process. The needs and
obligations are different for each stakeholder; some stakeholders have more needs than
obligations, some more obligations than needs. Because of the effect focused perspective being
taken, it is impossible to give a exact list of needs and obligations prior to a individual crime.
Nevertheless, Zehr gives a sketch.
The victim of a crime has primarily needs. Zehr identifies four victim needs: information;
to tell their story; empowerment; and restitution or vindication.36 The victim needs “answers to
questions they have about the offense. Why it happened and what has happened since.”37 This
information is subjective information; it is not enough for the victim to know the time, place, and
actions done. There is need to know the intent of the offender, as well as other experiential facts.
The victim wants to understand why what happened to him or her has happened. This goes
beyond the type of information allowed in a courtroom. The speech and vocabulary of the
courtroom is carefully chosen to determine guilt or degree of culpability, and regularly not quite
accurate of either the victim’s or offender’s internal experience of the crime. People experience
life in a subjective, first-person way. Victims of crimes need subjective, first-person answers to
their questions. Not seeking the impersonal information of the courtroom, the victim needs to be
given answers to their questions in terms that reflect how they experience in order to heal.
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Secondly, the victim needs to tell his or her story. The need for storytelling is likely to be
understood; society understands storytelling to be deeply connected to catharsis. For Zehr, this
retelling is a way for the victim to come to understand his or her life in the aftermath of trauma.
This allows their life narrative to be reclaimed.38 The goal here is a “re-storying of one’s life by
telling the story in significant settings, often where it can receive public acknowledgement.”39
The inclusion of public acknowledgement shows Zehr’s knowledge of John Braithwaite’s
Crime, shame and reintegration, a criminology text that is essential to much of how restorative
justice practice accounts for victim and offender needs. Braithwaite describes two types of
shaming: reintegrative shame and stigmatizing shame. Both forms of shame begin with the same
general shaming, which is a community response of disapproval of an action. Braithwaite is most
interested in what action follows the initial period of shame; reintegrative shame is shame
“followed by gestures of acceptance into the community…”40 Stigmatizing shaming, which is
not followed by these gestures, further alienates one from their community. Zehr argues that the
victim of trauma feels an alienation much like that which comes from shame, as crime
“represents a wound in the community, a tear in the web of relationships.”41 The victim feels torn
from their community, and they must be reintegrated. This is the secondary need involved in the
retelling of their story--the victim tells their story to their community in order to receive
Braithwaite’s “gestures of acceptance” thereby reintegrating into their community.
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Next, victims need to be empowered. Zehr writes that, “Their sense of personal autonomy
has been tarnished by the trauma, and they need to have this sense of personal power returned to
them.”42 This empowerment is heavily linked to control, as “being victimized is by definition an
experience of powerlessness - the victim was unable to prevent the crime from occurring.”43
Because of this, the victim requires the restoration of a sense of control and autonomy. While the
reassertion of control is accomplished in no set way, it is essential that the victim be heavily
involved in the process of justice. In giving the victim elements of control over their case, it
empowers and works to restore the victim’s sense of autonomy.
Finally, Zehr says that the victim needs restitution or vindication. Restitution is a
relatively basic need; if something is stolen or destroyed, the victim needs their previous status of
life restored. However, “restitution, in fact, is a symptom or sign of a more basic need, the need
for vindication.”44 Similar to why many view punishment as valuable, restitution works to
vindicate the victim by showing them that they are in the right. It is as if the offender is saying,
“I am taking responsibility, and you are not to blame.”45 The need for public restitution and
vindication is central to restorative justice because the relationships between victim and
community are damaged as well. Vindication is another way that victims are reintegrated as
members of the community in the way that Braithwaite describes. Vindication confirms for the
victim that they are not at fault and remain community members in good standing or are
re-integrated as such.
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In brief, the victim needs answers to questions they may have about their trauma, the
opportunity to tell and retell their story in order to reintegrate into their community, to be
empowered by having their autonomy returned, and vindication through restitution.
The crime is tragedy for the offender too. Restorative justice holds that the just response
to tragedy is that which heals the trauma that has occurred. This includes trauma of the offender,
which implies that the offender has needs and obligations as well.46 First, Offenders may initially
and temporarily require restraint in order to keep the greater community safe. The second of the
offender’s needs and obligations is the obligation to be accountable for their actions through
making amends. Third, offenders need community support in their efforts to be accountable; this
support must also be directed at efforts towards personal transformation and community
integration, such as through drug or alcohol rehabilitation, relocation, employment, or learning
skills.47
Zehr states that restraint is necessary in some cases. For the safety of the victim, the
community at large, and the offender themself, restraint may be necessary. This may also be a
need of the community. However, Zehr clarifies that this restraint is likely temporary in nature.
The purpose of restraint in a restorative justice perspective is to keep stakeholders safe during the
judicial process--restraint as punishment is not the goal. Of course, how long this restraint must
last in order to insure the safety of the community as well as how severe the restraint must be is a
matter of consideration and may rightfully vary among like crimes. What is important for the
theory of restorative justice is that an appropriate level of restraint is used and is used as
protection as opposed to punishment

46
47

All of the needs and obligations of the offender assume that the determination of guilt has been established.
Ibid., 15.

Silberstein 34

For the offender, the primary need is closer to an obligation; the offender ought to be
accountable and responsible for what they have done through making amends to the victim. The
current criminal justice system holds offenders accountable for crime through punishment, but
Zehr argues that this is not true accountability, for “offenders are discouraged from
acknowledging their responsibility and are given little opportunity to act on this responsibility in
concrete ways.”48 While restorative justice and retributive justice both aim to hold offenders
accountable, restorative justice believes that accountability is accomplished through actual
actions and interactions with the victim that attempt to make amends and give restitution.49 This
process is motivated by an understanding of the victim’s trauma; while the victim needs
information from the offender to understand and set their world view straight, the offender needs
to listen to the victim and understand the impact of their actions. This is an important step for the
offender to be able to give proper restitution and be accountable--one can only work to make
something right if they understand what is wrong.
The victim of a crime is frequently ashamed however, it is the offender that ought to be.
More so than in the case of the victim, Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming is
foundational to the needs and obligations of the offender. Braithwaite defines shaming as “all
social process of expressing disapproval which have the intention or effect of invoking remorse
in the person being shamed and/or condemnation by others who become aware of the shaming.”
50
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justice. However, a retributive system functions deintegrativly because it removes the potential
of further shaming by labeling those within the system irrevocably as criminal and often
removing them from society.
In contrast, restorative justice is a system that practices reintegrative shaming, in which
shame is followed by a process of reintegration.51 Shame also functions as a type of deterrent to
crime in that it embeds societal conscience in individuals similarly to how parents teach children.
However, Braithwaite states that, “there are times when conscience fails all of us, and we need a
refresher course in the consequences of a compromised conscience.”52 A refresher course is the
process of reintegrative shaming, which aligns offenders closer to societal understanding of
crime and pulls them back into society where their conscience will function to the greatest
extent. To this end the offender needs “encouragement and support for integration into the
community.”53 With the theory of reintegrative shaming in mind, this encouragement and support
are an obvious need; the offender needs to be brought back into the community because that will
increase the likelihood of restoration of the victim while decreasing the likelihood of
reoffending.
Braithwaite also argues that stigmatization increases the likelihood of reoffending. He
writes, “To the extent that shaming is of the stigmatizing rather than the reintegrative sort, and
that criminal subcultures are widespread and accessible in the society, higher crime rates will be
the result.”54 This is because the offender is pushed outside of the community, and is pushed into
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a criminal subculture where the stigma of the primary culture serves as a unifying trait.
Furthermore, the existence of these subcultures enables those labeled as criminals to become
better criminals; in the same way that learning is enabled in a community of students, crime is
enabled in a community of criminals. Techniques of crime, social support for crime, and criminal
role models are strengthened and localized when offenders are pushed out of the general
community.
The theory of reintegrative shaming shows that offenders do not just need encouragement
to reintegrate, but also need encouragement to personally transform.55 Because of how trauma
may lead to offending, being stigmatized without subsequent reintegration pushes one into
offending behavior. Therefore, it is likely that offenders need help to heal trauma that may have
lead to their offending. While this may seem contrary when viewed in a retributive perspective, it
is crucial to remember that restorative justice views justice as the healing of trauma and the
restoration of people. Therefore, justice includes not just the healing of the victim, but the
healing of the offender. This healing could involve help in overcoming addiction, training in
skills, or other techniques that either restore the offender or encourage the offender to reintegrate
back into the community.
Finally, beyond the victim and offender comes the needs and obligations of the
community, such as friends, family, neighbors, etc. In order to understand what restorative justice
sees as the needs of community, it is necessary to understand how restorative justice perceives
community. “Community is not a place.”56 Rather, community is understood as “a web of
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affect-laden relationships… and a measure of commitment to a set of shared values…”57
Braithwaite understands community as a set of “dense networks of individual interdependencies
with strong cultural commitments to mutuality of obligations.”58 While these definitions are
different, they include similar essential elements such as the importance of relationships and
interconnectivity. Furthermore, a community does not have a minimum or maximum physical
size, but does have shared values. Because community is interconnectivity and a shared vision,
and it has needs in the aftermath of trauma. When this understanding of community is combined
with the understanding of crime as a violation of interconnected relationships, it becomes clearer
in what sense community has needs; the web or network of relations has been wounded. Taken
literally, there is a hole in the community that must be repaired.
This brings us to Zehr’s list of community needs and obligations. These needs and
obligations are split into those for the community at large and those that apply to so called
“communities of care”, which is made up of individuals who are involved in the victim’s and
offender’s lives. These are families, neighbors, co-workers, or other connected people within the
community.59 Initially, individual members of the community have needs as the victim because
they may be personally traumatized as well. First, any individual community member must have
their needs as victims addressed. An important case of this need is one where the primary victim
has been killed, as their family will the primary victim. Second, a community must be able to
validate the values of the community--accountability in particular. Third, the community is
obligated to pursue the welfare of community members, such as victims and offenders, but also
other affected members; this includes creating an environment that promotes the welfare of all.
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The community also needs encouragement and assistance towards this end, which will come
from the judicial system. Finally, the community needs assurance that the offender will not
repeat their offence.60
Individuals in the community affected need “encouragement to take on their obligations
for the welfare of their members, including victims and offenders, and for the conditions that
promote healthy communities.”61 This is the connection between the community and the
victim/offender dyad. The community is responsible for the reintegration and general welfare of
the victim and offender as far as possible. Further, it is how the community is primarily set to be
involved in the process. Community members must be encouraged to work with the needs of
victims, to hold offenders accountable, and to reintegrate both victim and offender back into the
community.
This will allow the community at large the opportunity to heal the trauma that occurs
from crime. If community is made up by both interconnected relationships and a shared
understanding or goal, those are the areas that must be maintained and further strengthened; the
first step to healing the greater community is healing the broken section of the web or network.
This is Zehr’s third community need listed: the need for “opportunities to build a sense of
community and mutual accountability.”62 Again, community is not primarily a physical thing, so
repairing the understood idea of community and reassuring community members of mutual
accountability are the essential ways to heal community trauma although repairing physical
community structures is important when necessary. This process will likely also include
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discussion on why the trauma occurred initially, as addressing problems in the community that
might have lead to offending behavior is part of the restorative process.
To that end, the community also must work toward assuring that the offense will not be
repeated. This is the final community obligation that Zehr lists, and is important for the survival
of the community going forward. This obligation, ensuring future security, is in part a
community need: community members must discuss why the offense occurred, and what
obligations the community has in order to decrease the likelihood of future offenses. Similarly,
the community must work with the offender in assuring the offense does not happen again. The
offender is accountable for the damage they have caused to the victims relationship to the
community, and working to lower the victim’s worry of another trauma is integral to that
process. The community is involved in this process by insuring that the offender is held
accountable to their obligations. While the community needs and obligations are much less
specific than the victim or offender needs and obligations, the nature of the interconnected
understanding of community implies that all needs are in some way community needs and
community needs are in some way all needs.
Familiarity with a formal thesis of restorative justice is not common. However,
restorative justice can be found in many aspects of society. As previously stated, the western
criminal justice system contains a number of non-retributive aspects, of which the goals are
restoration or reintegration of stakeholders rather than punishing the offender. Parole is chief
among these with its emphasis on successful reintegration of offenders. Parole often is in
conjunction with mandatory rehabilitation for addiction or other issues such as mental health or
anger, which fall under restorative justice’s call for offender transformation. Beyond the criminal
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courts, the civil, juvenile, and family courts are even more restorative. The civil court focuses on
the offender making reparations to the complainant, the modern juvenile court is more and more
often attempting to increase the offenders community connection ala Braithwaite’s reintegrative
shame rather than incarceration, and the broader area of family law pursues a situation that is
best for all involved rather than prescribing a requisite punishment. Finally, restorative justice
can be seen in the ways that people with close ties resolve conflict; when someone in a
relationship, be it a friendship, marriage, family, or otherwise, is hurt by another, it is unlikely
that they will appeal to a third party for the appropriate punishment. Instead, they will
acknowledge the hurt, the offender will work to make amends, and the offender will ensure that
they will not harm the victim again, which may require support. This is not formal justice, but it
follows from the same understanding of community and harm from which restorative justice
proceeds.
To summarize, restorative justice holds that crime inflicts trauma by damaging
individual’s relationships to each other and a greater community. This trauma impacts not only
the victim of a crime, but the offender, as well as other community members and the community
at large. Those affected by trauma are referred to as stakeholders within the restorative justice
theory, and these stakeholders have both needs and obligations towards the achievement of a
state of justice that is restorative in nature. How these needs and obligations are carried out
varies based on the type of practice that is put in place. Nevertheless, a brief overview of
practices is necessary for a full understanding of how restorative justice aims to restore the
victim, offender, and community.

Silberstein 41

Restorative Practices
Restorative practices are primarily based on engagement of stakeholders. This is fairly
visible when the needs and obligations are taken in sum, as most are things for the stakeholders
to do rather than things to be done to the stakeholders. Zehr states that “a direct, facilitated,
face-to-face encounter with adequate screening, preparation and safeguards is often an ideal
forum for this involvement…”63 What is described here is a primary ideal of restorative practice;
that individuals interact in order to fulfil their needs and obligations such as the victim’s need for
answers or the offenders obligation to give that information--when stakeholders encounter each
other depends on the practice or program, but encounters always occur after guilt has been found
and the encounter has been properly prepared. Of course, there are cases when direct encounters
are not possible, inappropriate, or perhaps even safe. In these cases, proxies are used, or other
methods to fulfill the needs described above. As much as is possible, restorative justice works to
have the judicial process be a collaboration between stakeholders in order to achieve a mutually
agreed upon and understood outcome.
Many believe that the best example of restorative practices is conferencing, as it involves
the most stakeholders. A conference is an encounter between all three sets of stakeholders in
which the victim and offender needs for understanding are facilitated and amends are decided
upon. It should be noted that traditional practices of pre modern societies inspire many models of
restorative practices. The prototypical conference, which reflected a traditional Maori practice,
occurred in 1989 New Zealand in order to empower the children of the Maori aboriginal people.
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This set a standard that has been used to institutionalize restorative justice in New Zealand. That
conference “was designed to bring families of victims and offenders together to find their own
solutions to conflicts.”64 This is quite in keeping with the tenants of restorative justice, for a
collaborative, healing focused outcome is the aim.
What is called victim-offender mediation is another good example of restorative practices.
Based on an Ontario vandalism case in 1974, Canadian victim-offender mediation, or VOM, was
“essentially the only restorative process”65 being practiced in an modern institutional justice
system until 1989. VOM is an encounter between a victim and offender in the presence of a
mediator in order to fulfill the needs and obligations listed above. The mediation is a stage for
the victim and offender to have honest interactions; the third party is a facilitator who ensures
safety but does not lead toward a specific goal. A facilitator might be a judge, but the
qualification for this role is facilitation and restorative justice training. This also shows the
highest goal of a VOM and restorative justice at large: healing trauma. A VOM is different from
civil mediation, a current judicial process in western justice systems in that,“where a civil
mediator may be quite willing to offer opinions about a party’s position and direction about a
possible outcome, most VOM facilitators do not…”66
The primary distinction between a VOM and a conference is that the community is
involved in a conference while a VOM is solely a dialogue between the victim and offender.
Nevertheless, variations of VOMs have developed such that it may seem as though there is
“...little difference between a multi-party VOM and conferencing.”67 There is certainly some
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truth to this viewpoint, but the necessary inclusion of family members and other non-victim,
non-offender parties can allow for other viewpoints to overwhelm that of the direct stakeholders.
A further distinction is that it is possible to have a conference without the victim, where a VOM
requires victim participation.
A final example of a typical restorative practice is what are called circles. Circles
originate from North American aboriginal people, and can be distinguished from circles in that
they allow for the involvement of any community member regardless of connection to the crime.
This involvement means that circles may include a dramatically more diverse group with more
connections. Circles share the same restorative traits as VOM and conferencing; circles are
facilitated meetings between stakeholders--like conferences, circles include other community
members--in order to achieve a mutually agreed to outcome and understanding.
In effect, all three described practices involve dialogue that works to directly fulfil needs
and obligations or to decide how those needs and obligations will be fulfilled. The difference
comes from who is there, who speaks, and the amount of framing for the meeting among other
factors. What has been described above is a restorative justice approach to sentencing. While the
“sentence” agreed to ought to fulfill stakeholder needs and obligations, which helps to protect the
process from uneven outcomes, the lack of an objective standard may be of concern. Restorative
practices do not follow the same laws of consistency and proportionality of retributive justice in
that the sentence is not only based on the specific crime done. Nevertheless, when practiced
correctly and done with strong stakeholder participation, restorative practices are able to achieve
meaningful justice.
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Making amends can be very difficult for an offender; anyone who has felt truly guilty and
ashamed, who has apologized to someone they have deeply hurt, or has struggled to right a
wrong they have done all know the truth of that statement. This has led many to object that the
process of restorative justice that offenders undergo amounts to punishment. Some proponents of
restorative justice use this to argue that restorative justice is not mutually exclusive from
retributive justice. Others work to distance restorative justice from punishment due to the view
that there can be no good intentional harm, which some restorative justice proponents hold. Of
course, rehabilitative shaming casts a large amount of doubt as to the strength of the latter belief.
Nevertheless, restorative processes do not constitute a punitive process and are not
punishment. One can theorize different judicial processes on a chart, where one axis measures
levels of control, and the other axis measures levels of support, as pictured below. A system that
has low levels of both will be neglectful, as it fails to either support offenders and victims after
crime and it fails to hold offenders responsible for their actions. A neglectful system practically
does not act. A system that is low in control and high in support is overly permissive, for it
supports stakeholders without promoting responsibility. Many incorrectly identify restorative
justice as permissive, but they forget how restorative justice holds offenders accountable and
instills a responsible disposition. A system that is high only in control is a punitive system that
does not seek to support stakeholders, but it only controls the offender. Last, a system that is
relatively high in both support and control is restorative; it works with stakeholders in the ways
described above in order to account for needs while maintaining obligations. Wachtel, the creator
of this Social Discipline Window, summarizes how each category processes stakeholders as
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“not”, “for”, “to”, and “with” respectively.68 This is to say that the actions of each type of
system--neglectful, permissive, punitive, and restorative--can be well summarized by the words
above. Most importantly for this discussion, a punitive punishment is done to offenders, while
restorative processes are done with offenders. When evaluating programs, process, and practices
as punishment or otherwise, a strong start is to question whether the system is being done “to” or
done “with” offenders.

IV. Evaluating the Systems
Restorative justice and retributive justice see injustice in crime and seek to identify the
offender, as well as accept the importance that rectification occur. After identifying injustice, the
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two systems diverge. Restorative justice posits that it is the harm essential to crime that is unjust,
harm that the victim, offender, and community all have stake in. Justice is done through healing
the harm inflicted by crime. Retributive justice, in contrast to restorative justice, states that while
the harm is relevant, the crime is essentially unjust and ought to be punished. Crime is not bad
because of any consequences that come from it, such as harm, but rather crime simply is
immoral. The different understanding of why crime is unjust causes different paths to achieving
justice. For Restorative and retributive justice, there are differences from the outset to the
conclusion of the judicial process. Each system will be evaluated using Aristotle’s definition of
justice in rectification described in chapter one, namely that rectificatory justice is the
“intermediate between profit and loss.”

Retribution
The overwhelmingly accepted technique for pursuing rectificatory justice in the west,
retributive justice holds that justice is done through consistently proportional punishment. Crime
must be punished because those that disobey the moral law ought to be punished, because society
has a duty not to perpetuate injustice by not punishing, and because punishing crime is in
keeping with Kant’s formulation of the highest good. This final point is very important to
evaluating retributive justice because the highest good is a condition by which each individual
gets exactly what they deserve according to their virtue. While a Kantian deontological system of
retributive justice firmly holds that no one ought to be used to achieve an end, it also holds that
the best and most ideal world is one that follows the rules of just desserts, and that punishing
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crime is part of how that world is brought about or accessed. This is in keeping with Aristotle’s
justice as rectification because it pursues the law of no profit and no loss and does so using a
numerical system, and while different from, it continues with lex talionis (understood
proportionally) and suum cuique.
Kantian retribution pursues justice in the manner described by justice as rectification.
Aristotle is clear that this is to be done numerically, and retributive justice follows this
requirement. Due to the dual tenets of proportionality and consistency, punishment is meted out
on a quantitative basis. The offender is judged to be guilty of a certain wrong action, and they are
to be treated akin to every other person who has committed that action. Indeed, they are not to be
treated based on any individual characteristics they possess, but only as “murderer” or “thief.”
This allows for a system that works with exceptional clarity and precision in its proportionality
and promotes consistency between punishments. The consistent proportionality of retributive
punishment aligns with justice as rectification’s pursuit of numericality because the
proportionality effectively assigns quantitative values to the crimes committed. Retributive
justice allows the justice system to numerically understand the crime and therefore to dole out
the numerically equivalent punishment. The offender is a certain amount or distance away from
the condition of just desserts, and a certain amount of punishment will right that situation.
Nevertheless, it is my claim that a Kantian system of retributive justice will always fail to
achieve the intermediate state described by Aristotle because it neglects the victim. Justice in
rectification requires that the profit be subtracted from the offender and added to the victim such
that the victim and the offender exist at the intermediate, which is where each has the just
amount of suffering and pleasure. Retributive justice certainly fulfills the initial step of
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subtracting from the offender, as punishing the offender adds suffering to them. Indeed, this
punishment is done to bring the offender to the condition of just desserts, which is the same
condition desired in justice as rectification. This is the strength of retributive justice. Punishing
crime rights one side of the imbalance that crime creates between morality and well being.
Punishment brings offenders and punishers alike into the world of the highest good, where moral
ends and actions are treated with benevolence, and immoral ends and actions are punished.
Retributive justice strives to bring the offender to where their well being reflects their virtue, and
this is what justice as rectification calls for.
However, it is not all of what justice as rectification calls for. It has forgotten the victim,
whose suffering is likely not reflective of their virtue, but caused by the immorality of another, to
say nothing of the community. The victim may be eased by the punishment of the offender, but a
Kantian retributive justice forbids using the offender as a means to to promote the end of the
victim, so punishment of the offender cannot be done to improve the situation of the victim. This
means that in a system where punishment is the primary and only judicial function, the victim is
entirely disregarded beyond their part in discovering the guilt of the offender and perhaps
affecting sentencing. By failing to alleviate the victim’s loss, retributive justice only succeeds in
half of the Aristotelian metric laid out. Justice in rectification as described by Aristotle and as
generally understood includes the rectification of the victim. By failing to work towards the
betterment of the victim, retributive justice does not fully rectify the effects of crime; only the
offender if brought to the intermediate position.
This is not to say that rectification for the victim does cannot be justified through a
Kantian system. Kant’s conception of the highest good is one justification for why offenders
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ought to be punished, but it also serves as a justification for victim rectification; the victim’s well
being has been worsened because of the immorality of another. The victim’s suffering is likely
not reflective of their virtue, which implies that, in pursuit of Kant’s highest good, the victim
should be made to suffer less. Furthermore, the categorical imperative likely holds that the victim
ought to be rectified as well although this cannot be achieved through punishment. A retributive
system, even one justified through Kant, puts the well being of the victim secondary to the
punishment of the offender. This does not abide by the requirements put forth by Aristotle, nor is
it consistent with Kant.
Kantian retributive justice, along with the revenge and deterrence centered formulations
described above, focuses entirely on punishment to the neglect of the victim. This goes against
the general understanding of how injustice ought to be rectified, which put broadly will likely be
that the offender is worsened and the victim is benefited. That general understanding can also be
seen in the American criminal justice system, which does not just punish thieves, but also
compensates victims for their losses (although the family of a murder victim receive no
compensation). If Aristotle’s description of injustice in rectification is to be followed here, the
victim remains at a loss, and the offender--assuming that retributive justice achieves what it
aims--will be at or around the intermediate condition, which is a numerically higher position than
the victim. According to the justice as rectification and a general sense of how rectification ought
to be, retributive justice is substantially lacking.

Restoration
Restorative justice understands harm as the reason crime is unjust, sees community as a
web of interpersonal relationships that is harmed by crime, involves a broad amount of
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stakeholders, accounts for the internal experience of harm, and believes the judicial process
ought to be the process of healing incurred harm. In turn, restorative justice defines injustice
through harm rather than the failure to follow a deontological law or code, and accounts for harm
to all stakeholders. A final characteristic of restorative justice is the primacy placed on the goal
of restoration; restorative justice is primarily a teleological and communitarian theory of justice.
These characteristics can now be evaluated from the perspective of Aristotle’s standard
for rectificatory justice, the intermediate between profit and loss. Immediately upon seeing the
theory next to the standard, it is clear that both are interested in a condition or outcome of justice.
The intermediate is a “place”, which can only be conceived of as a goal. This goal must be,
according to Aristotle, the object of the judicial process. On this preliminary requirement,
restorative justice agrees. Restorative justice is a teleological, or goal oriented, theory that posits
justice as an achievable state rather than a way to act.69 Whichever process achieves the most
restorative outcome is best. This can be seen through the use of evidence based validations of
restorative justice, which “demonstrate positive impact on outcomes such as reoffending, victim
satisfaction and other indicators.”70 Restorative justice preliminarily fits into Aristotle’s
rectificatory justice, as they both aim to achieve a just condition.71
As stated above, Aristotle’s pursuit of the intermediate condition between profit and loss
is the other essential piece of rectificatory justice. Loss is the larger amount of suffering that is
the victim’s, and profit is the smaller amount of suffering that is the offender’s. Suffering caused
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by crime has many manifestations both internal and external, subjective and objective, and both
aspects must be accounted for. The object of rectificatory justice is then to ensure that those
involved have neither a profit nor a loss, which will be the middle point between the incurred
suffering of the crime. Profit is the condition of having more pleasure or less suffering than
deserved, and loss is profits opposite. The intermediate condition can be therefore described as
the “correct” amount of pleasure and suffering in reference to the unjust act. The question then
becomes how the intermediate condition compares to the condition sought in restorative justice.
Restorative justice pursues restoration, which, in the analogy of harm, ought to be
understood as healing. Healing is essentially the process of becoming or being brought closer to
completeness, as harm destroys or disrupts completeness or fullness, healing restores to a full
and complete state. In the case of restorative justice, that state has individual and community
aspects. Individually, the negative harm, or loss, that the victim has experienced ought to be
healed, and the offender, individually, is obliged. It is true that it may not be possible to return to
exactly the preharm state, but the overall aim is a restorative solution to harm. A lost limb can
never be restored, but this does not prevent a restoration of general quality of life; the aim is to
bring the victim back to a comparable quality of life and to a comparable level of functioning.
Offenders too ought to be restored as far as possible. Of course, the offender’s path to
restoration is essentially different from the victims; offenders need to held accountable for their
actions, to make amends, and be reintegrated into the community. Linked to the needs of
individual stakeholders is the need to be restored as full community members because restorative
justice holds that crime removes victim and offender alike from a just state of individual and
community functioning.
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The further question is what is involved in being a full community member, and if that
aligns with Aristotle’s requirement of the intermediate between profit and loss. For restorative
justice theorists, there is an active conception of being a full community member beyond simply
existing in the same space. A full community member respects his or her other community
members for their intrinsic value rather than their practical value. The full community member
also practices solidarity with their community members. To practice solidarity requires
companionship and mutual support, so community members are to be with their fellow members
during good and bad times. Partly, this comes from living with one another, but involves
reciprocated support and empathy. The community member also is responsible for their actions
in both the internal and external effects.72 Therefore, restorative justice pursues two connected
but separate conditions for stakeholders, restored individual selves and full community members.
Restorative justice seeks to achieve balance through bringing all stakeholders up to the
dual conditions of unharmed individual life and full community member rather than by balancing
through addition and subtraction. Justice is to heal suffering, so it is not just to seek equilibrium
by giving the offender half or all of the victim’s suffering because that is only changing the
location of suffering. This may seem to imply that restorative justice does not seek an
intermediate condition between victim and offender however that is not the case. Restorative
justice pursues an equivalent position for victim and offender intermediate between extremes of
suffering by pursuing a condition without profit or loss for all stakeholders. When neither victim,
offender, nor community have profit or loss, then justice has been achieved. It can be argued that
restorative justice leaves the offender at a profit due to lack of punishment, but this fails to
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account for and misunderstands the demands of restorative processes, for restorative justice
requires the thief to return what they have stolen and ensures that the thief understands the value
of the victim and community. The process of restorative justice assigns the victim significant
needs and few obligations, while it assigns the offender few needs and significant obligations.
This process does not necessitate the offender suffering, but making amends and being
responsible may cause the offender to suffer; being restorative does not bar these obligations
from requiring due tolls from the offender, and offender obligations are likely demanding.
Learning the breadth of the harm you have caused, apologizing, and working to amend a harm
that likely cannot be fully fixed is unlikely to leave the offender with their profit. By assigning
the offender demanding obligations restorative justice strives towards Aristotle’s intermediate
condition.
Restorative justice aims to bring victims and offenders exactly to the condition they
deserve. It does not wish to elevate the victim over the offender, nor to push the offender down to
the level of the victim, but rather pursues an equal condition for both that of restored individual
and full community member. For the victim, this is a decrease in the amount of suffering they
have. Primarily through the work toward individual restoration, restorative justice fully
acknowledges and confronts the internal experience of harm that victims have; this includes how
the victim feels alienated and separated from their community. Restorative support techniques
and practices reduce the victim’s suffering, and they are restored to their deserved condition of
full community member. For the offender, restorative justice has primarily expectations, and it is
through fulfilling those expectations and obligations that an offender is brought to justice.
Beyond victims and offenders, restorative justice acknowledges that the community has needs as
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well. The condition that restorative justice aims to restore community to is very similar to the
aimed condition of victims. A community is understood to be damaged by crime, and that
damage being restored is a essential condition for success in restorative justice. Restorative
justice should not be imagined as balancing a scale where an offender rests on one side and a
victim the other. Instead, one ought to imagine three independent scales, one for the victim,
offender, and community, which are all to be balanced; one scale may tip more to the left while
another may tip to the right, so while the balancing process will be different, the end result ought
to be the equivalent.
The traits of restorative justice as described above slightly differ from the zero sum game
that can be inferred from Aristotle. Aristotle describes a zero sum game where the goal is the
intermediate condition between suffering of the victim and offender, loss and profit. Restorative
justice indeed seeks a goal and an equivalent position, but that position is not necessarily, nor
likely to be, the numerical middle point between the suffering the victim has experienced and the
lack of suffering the offender has experienced. Instead, restorative justice aims to have those
involved in crime to be brought to an equivalent state that accounts for all the suffering that has
occurred, and fulfills Aristotle’s urge that stakeholders “have their own share, and make neither a
loss nor a profit.”73 While Aristotle describes the pursuit of rectificatory justice as a numerical
zero sum game, the requirement of so-called just deserts and one’s own share hold the primary
position in Aristotle’s metric. This means that restorative justice, which seeks to have
stakeholders reach their own deserving position, is in fitting rectificatory justice.
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The discrepancy between restorative justice and the Aristotelian metric points to the
originality of restorative justice. By moving away from a zero sum game in which the offender
must be worsened in order to better the victim, restorative justice shows that justice can be
accomplished in a non-adversarial manner. Indeed, restorative justice shows that justice in
rectification is better achieved “with” stakeholders rather than done “to” the offender. Restorative
justice further critiques the conventional understanding of justice in rectification and questions
the primacy of objective and external facts in rectificatory justice by elevating the internal
experience of trauma as the vital understanding of harm. However, this focus does not blind
restorative justice to the reality of external harm, for restorative justice does not disregard stolen
property to focus on the victim’s experience; if a victim’s car is stolen, then restorative justice
will insure that the car is returned or replaced. Rather than stop after returning the victim’s car,
restorative justice holds that the stolen property affects a harm beyond the lack of a car. The
experiential aspect as well as the physical aspects of crime must be rectified in order for justice
to be done.
While both retributive justice and restorative justice fail to fully meet the standards of
justice in rectification, how they fail brings light to their assets and flaws. Retributive justice
focuses so much on the offender in effect and justification, that it neglects the victim. Failing to
bring the victim to the intermediate condition between profit and loss is the major flaw of
retributive justice. Restorative justice pursues a similar, but different kind of condition; while
Aristotle speaks about a linear line that contains the victim and the offender and measures
equality, restorative justice argues that the victim and offender have their own line. Neither
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system perfectly achieves the justice in rectification set out by Aristotle, but restorative justice’s
ability to account for both the victim and the offender elevates it over retributive justice.
Restorative justice more broadly and fully accounts for the needs of justice as
rectification than retributive justice because it seeks to rectify the victim, community, and
offender rather than only the offender. This has been shown via theoretical analysis, but is also
visible in the world. The following section will delve into restorative justice in the world: how it
can be best implemented, how well the theory of restorative justice represents implemented
restorative programs, and finally a brief analysis of research on the effectiveness of restorative
justice.

Restorative Justice Applied
How then ought restorative principles and practices be implemented? While it may be
possible to answer this question from the armchair, historical implementations of restorative
principles give useful models on failures and successes. The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Committee is one such model, and while it is not restorative justice through and
through, it does “combine a notion of restorative justice with a search for truth.”74 Restorative
principles such as the victim’s need for truth, the absence of punishment, and the goal of
reintegration are all present in the TRC. Of course, the scale and depth of injustice that the TRC
attempt to address are far different than the individual level justice described in this paper.
Nevertheless, the principles remain restorative and the TRC can fairly be described as a type of
restorative justice. Furthermore, despite reasonable critiques on the fairness of the TRC and its
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success in achieving justice, that South Africa successfully navigated the transition between
governments without violence and has continued to exist is a compelling testament towards the
success of South Africa’s TRC. The design of the TRC provides a good model as to how
restorative justice may best be implemented.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee contained, along with the
primary body a Committee on Human Rights Violations, a Committee on Amnesty, and a
Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation.75 These committees can be analogized to the
primary pieces of restorative justice; human rights violation is generalized to harm created from
crime. Amnesty, which is a political concept, is instead generalized to the absence of punishment
that restorative justice has. Finally, reparation and rehabilitation are simply the amends made for
the victim and the reintegration of victim and offender. Drawing these analogies further shows
the restorative principles within the TRC, but also illuminates how restorative justice can be
institutionalized. South Africa created an official body for discovering harm, and another for
working towards directly rectifying victims and reintegrating stakeholders. A restorative system
could follow a similar model, where different bodies, such as a group for discovering harm, and a
group for guiding the process of making amends and rehabilitation, govern the processes of
restorative justice. To extend the TRC as an example, the Committee on Amnesty acts as a
gatekeeper into the restorative system. However, restorative justice in part assumes the absence
of punishment. This is to say that the Committee on Amnesty had the function of giving amnesty,
but such a function does not exist within a restorative system. Nevertheless, the Committee on
Amnesty illuminates a concern in actualizing a restorative system.
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Will a system of restorative justice work for every case, and if not, how will those cases
be identified and handled? To answer this question, the Committee on Amnesty must be further
explained. The Committee on Amnesty should not be thought of as a bread line, which gave
amnesty to whoever joined the line. Instead, “amnesty would be available, but only
conditionally: to individually who personally applied for it and who disclosed fully the facts of
misdeeds…”76 This is in keeping with restorative justice’s requirement of active participation; it
is not enough simply to get into the line, one must admit their guilt and work towards making
amends. For the TRC, which was heavily focused on finding the truth of harms that only
outgoing officials knew of, full disclosure of their political misdeeds and crimes is enough for
amnesty. For restorative justice, it is through offenders taking responsibility, admitting guilt, and
making amends that justice is done, and this process assumes the lack of punishment that is
analogous to political amnesty. If one applied the language of the Committee on Amnesty, an
offender being accountable and responsible is enough for amnesty; it is enough for justice.
Of course, the TRC was formed for a special situation that may seem not to be applicable
to an ordinary justice system. Nevertheless, the TRC gives a model for how to solve the problem
of how a justice system can process offenders that cannot be processed by a restorative system.
If an offender will not take responsibility for their actions and be accountable, then restorative
justice will not work for them; an offender that never admits their guilt cannot take part in
restorative justice, but in the TRC, amnesty was given through application and earned. Those
who did not receive amnesty were processed in a retributive system.
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A similar model of restorative justice can be theorized that exists alongside another
system based on a different theory, such as retribution. This would mean that offenders could be
processed through either the restorative or retributive system according to how they are
responsible and accountable to their actions. In a system such as this, all victims would go
through a restorative body, such as the Committee for Reparation and Rehabilitation.
Perhaps this would include a process such as the Sycamore Tree Project that connects
victims and offenders from separate crimes, for those victims whose offenders denied their guilt.
However it may look, any system must include actively addressing victim rectification. This dual
theory model would allow for a pure restorative justice that is entirely based on voluntary
participation. It is noteworthy that very few offenders would fall under this category. Not only
does this system incentivize an offender to admit their guilt, as a restorative process is less
threatening than punishment, but already the vast majority, around ninety percent, of United
States criminal cases result in a guilty plea.77 This implies that a similar, if not greater, percentage
of offenders would admit their guilt in a restorative system, and the number of offenders who
could not be processed by a restorative system would amount to the great minority.
Another possible model for implementing restorative justice is one in which all offenders
are required to make amends to victims and participate fully in restorative processes regardless
of how they understand their responsibility. This would mean that even an offender who denied
their guilt would be forced to participate. Of course, it is questionable whether this would be
beneficial to either the victim or offender; if the victim should have an encounter through VOM
or a group conference with an unrepentant offender, will this further harm the victim? The
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system of restorative justice would not allow this case to happen. Before any type of encounter,
there is a long process of preparation with a facilitation party, who would prevent such an
encounter from taking place. What then would a coercive restorative system look like? Would
there be value in an offender who is forced to make amends or apologize to the victim? Could
such a system be called restorative, as this is being done “to” rather than “with” the offender? A
coercive restorative system brings with it many added difficulties and questions. Furthermore, a
system that coerces restorative practices does not have the same body of research, and cannot be
said to have the same effects as its non coercive counterpart.
It appears then that the best possible institutional system of restorative justice will fall
under a dual model, such as the design of the South African TRC. Indeed, the societal effects of a
system that promotes offenders to be responsible and accountable rather than an advisory of the
state who ought to deny their guilt could be tremendous; it is possible, perhaps even likely, that
the existence of a restorative system would greatly increase the amount of offenders that come
forward after committing a crime. This stands on an assumption that restorative justice is more
than a strong theory. By comparing two cases, one which moves through a retributive system and
another that is handled through a restorative system, the actual strengths of restorative justice are
clarified.
Our primarily retributive system is not solely retributive. It includes some
quasi-restorative elements such as parole. In order to compare a retributive system and a
restorative system, a case from each system will be put forth and analysed. The first is taken
from a variety of news articles written on the case, the following is a description of one particular
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offender process through the American justice system. Like the retributive system it comes from,
this description focuses on objective external facts.
On a Saturday at 11:30, 18 year old Phillip Allen Garcia crashed into the car of Edward
Czarnecki. An investigation of the crash including the offenders airbag control module and cell
phone records found that the offender was travelling around 73 mph and his phone was in use
around the time when he failed to stop at a stop sign, drove through an intersection, and crashed
into the victim’s vehicle. Edward Czarnecki was killed, and Phillip Garcia was charged with a
felony charge of reckless driving causing death.
Months later, Mr. Garcia waived his right to a preliminary hearing and was convicted as
guilty of his felony charge. Waiving his right to a preliminary hearing, Mr. Garcia likely pleaded
guilty to the charge, and was sentenced to 270 days in jail as well as five years on parole in the
presence of the victim’s sister and niece.
When the offender is released from jail, around September of 2018, he will be put on
parole. In the state of Michigan, where this case occurred,
“Parolees must meet certain conditions to maintain their parole status. There are general
conditions of parole which require the parolee to report regularly to the parole agent,
prohibit travel out of state without the agent's permission, require the parolee to maintain
employment, to obey the law, to submit to drug and alcohol testing at the agent's request,
and to reside at an approved residence. The parolee must also avoid any unauthorized
association with known criminals and cannot possess firearms.”78
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Parolees are also matched with a parole officer, who manages a number of parolees through the
transition from prison or jail. Parole officers are responsible for ensuring that the parolee abides
by the rules listed above, and are supported by a variety of community resources such as housing
and employment personnel, mental health and substance abuse professionals, and community
faith leaders. So, when the offender of this case is released, he will be matched with an officer.
That officer will ensure that Mr. Garcia abides by the rules of parole, and may make use of
community resources as they see fit. Should all things go as well as possible, Mr. Garcia will be
released from parole and return fully to society after a period of five years,.
Of course, parolee is not an entirely retributive notion. Parole is a process that helps
offenders re-enter society, which could certainly be understood as restorative in nature. This case
is representative of retributive justice all the same. It follows the requirements of consistent and
proportional punishment because the particular crime has a minimum and maximum punishment,
which forces proportionality and consistency, and this process seeks to give the offender their
just deserts. Mr. Garcia will re-enter American society if all goes well having been brought to
justice through punishment. Assuming that happens, the retributive system has accomplished the
primary goal of punishing crime as well perhaps deterring future crime. Despite Mr. Garcia’s
case fulfilling the expectations of retributive justice, it also shows the neglect of victims.
My point in using this example, is that this heavily retributive system uses
quasi-restorative methods such as parole. Even so, it neglects what restorative justice does not,
the victim and community. The hole left in the community from the death has been neglected as
anything other than a reason to punish; there has been no judicial action done in order to rectify
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the other stakeholders, and the family members of the deceased were part of the judicial process
as spectators only.
In comparison to Mr. Garcia’s case, the following describes a similar crime in New
Zealand that was remanded to their restorative justice system. The crime in this case is also
reckless driving causing death; here, a woman crashed into a car which a pregnant mother was
driving. While the baby survived, the mother did not. The stakeholders, after a significant
amount of preparation, engaged in a conference in order to encounter each other and work out
what amends the offender could make. “The offender, unemployed, did not have much money to
offer in reparation. All she could do was sob and blurt inadequate apology. The surviving
husband, holding the baby in his arms at the conference did not want money to compensate for
the loss of his wife.” The conference continued for several hours, and a variety of possible
reparations were put forth, however what was eventually decided upon was that the offender and
her family would pay for the cost of deceased’s headstone, which was currently too expensive for
the family to afford. In the words of the victim’s husband,
“The reason I ask for this is that, in the future, when I take my boy,” looking down at him
as he spoke these words, “to where his mum is buried, I can tell him that the young
woman responsible for your mother’s death put this headstone here for us.” The offender
agreed. A justice meaningful to these parties had been identified.”
With the reparation decided upon, the conference brought their decision to the court that
remanded them, the judge agreed that it was acceptable, and the offender was left with the
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responsibility of fulfilling the decision. Of course, if she failed to do so then she would be
recalled for further sentencing.79
This case study validates the explanation of restorative justice given here. The case
described aligns with the needs and obligations framework, places great importance on
stakeholder involvement, and achieves an outcome that helps all those involved be restored as
individuals and community members. It does not neglect anyone, nor does it fail to hold the
offender accountable. It has judicial oversight to ensure a fair and reasonable process as well as
outcome. The primary pursuit of justice is to right the wrong that has been committed as best as
possible. This case is a successful model for restorative justice.
Some may state that a single case does not prove a successful theory, and they would be
correct. Indeed, the question of how effective restorative justice is has been the subject of debate
and research in recent years. This research has shown that restorative justice not only more
actively pursues a just condition for more stakeholders than retributive justice, but restorative
processes also leave stakeholders more satisfied with the justice achieved. Satisfaction and the
feeling of fairness are used as metrics of success for restorative justice because the theory
focuses heavily on the internal experience of harm. If participants feel as though justice was
achieved and done so in a fair manner, then restorative justice considers that a success. A 2000
meta study analyzed 40 different studies of victim and offender satisfaction as well as sense of
fairness.80 These studies researched several countries including the United States, Canada,
England, Australia, and New Zealand, and range from juvenile burglaries to adult drunk driving.
Roughly a third of the programs studied are retributive processes, another third are partially
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restorative--defined as involving two sets of direct stakeholders-- and the final third are fully
restorative, which is defined as having all three sets of stakeholders, victim, offender and
community. The study then measured how victims and offenders rated their levels of satisfaction
after their case has been processed and how fairly they felt the case was handled.
The results of this research are quite compelling. Of offenders studied here, 95% felt
satisfied with the fully restorative programs. In the partially restorative program, 85% felt
satisfied with the partially restorative programs, and 83% felt satisfied by the non-restorative
programs. The percentages for fairness roughly follow the percentages for satisfaction. The fully
restorative program had a 94% fairness rating, 87% of offenders felt that the partially restorative
programs were fair, and 78% of offenders felt that the non restorative programs were fair.
Of victims, 91% from fully restorative programs reported feeling satisfied with the
outcome of the program. These fully restorative programs are conferences such as the case
above. For the partially restorative programs, which are primarily victim-offender mediation
programs, 81% of the victims reported being satisfied by the process. Finally, only 55% of
victims from non-restorative, or retributive, programs reported feeling satisfied by the justice
achieved. Using the theoretical restorative framework, it appears as though this confirms the
victim’s need for involvement, as the victim is most involved in the fully restorative program and
not involved in the non-restorative program.
These numbers are roughly consistent for victim’s feelings on the fairness of the
programs. For the fully restorative programs, 96% of victims reported feeling as though the
program was fair. In the partially restorative programs, 87% reported that the partially restorative
programs were fair, and only 56% of the non-restorative programs felt that they were fair. This
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data not only gives a strong case for validating the theory of restorative justice that puts great
stock in victim involvement, but shows that, on average, restorative programs do indeed rectify
the victims of crime.
This further keeps with the evaluation of retributive justice earlier, for retribution may in
fact do a satisfactory job bringing offenders to the intermediate condition of justice, and
retributive justice certainly focuses more strongly on the offender than the victim, which helps to
explain why the offender will on average be more satisfied than a victim by a retributive process.
Nevertheless, the restorative programs also exceed the retributive programs in offender
satisfaction. One may think that this is because the offender is more satisfied with getting away
with their crime without harsh punishment, but when taken in tandem with the high percentages
of victim satisfaction and victim feelings of fairness, this seems unlikely; a case where an
offender is not accountable and responsible would likely mean that the victim would not be
satisfied.81
Restorative justice successfully brings the great majority of victims and offenders, as well
as their communities, to a satisfying condition of justice through a process that the great majority
deem fair. This topic has been further researched in the years since, and the results given above
further supported, as well as further data that suggests offender recidivism is reduced in
offenders who go through restorative programs.82 This is to say that restorative justice has both a
strong theoretical validation in how it meets the expectations of justice in rectification, but that it
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also has compelling statistical data that supports the truthfulness of its theoretical validation.
Restorative justice achieves justice in rectification.
However an implementation of restorative justice ought to be done, the lessons of
restorative justice are quite clear. If justice requires all those affected by crime to be rectified, it
is not enough to punish offenders. Victims must be restored, and the harm done to the
community must be rectified as well. Restorative justice shows how we ought to acknowledge
and confront harm in our communities, understands the needs of victims, the obligations
offenders have towards those needs, and how the greater community fits into achieving justice.
While restorative justice is not perfect, the appropriate comparison is not between this theory and
perfection; it is between the currently used overwhelmingly retributive system and restorative
justice. The two paths explored here, inflicting harm and promoting healing, both pursue justice.
Nevertheless, harm, even a just harm, cannot fix a victim or community, nor does it attempt to do
so. The retributive path neglects tremendous parts of injustice, and thus fails to lead to justice. It
is the restorative path to justice that can accept a complete picture of injustice. A greater justice
is achieved through healing and restoration.

Bibliography
1. MacIntyre, Alasdair C. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Bloomsbury,
2014.
2. Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1999.

Silberstein 68

3. Johnstone, Gerry, and Van Ness Daniel W. Handbook of Restorative Justice. London:
Routledge, 2011.
4.

Bazemore, Gordon, and Elis, Lori. “Evaluation of restorative justice.” in Johnstone, and
Van Ness. 2011.

5.

Bradshaw, B., Roseborough, D. (2005). Restorative justice dialogue: The impact of
mediation and conferencing on juvenile recidivism. Federal Probation, 69 (2), 15 – 21.

6. Braithwaite, John. Crime, shame and reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007.
7. Brettschneider, Corey. Punishment, Property and Justice: Philosophical Foundations of
the Death Penalty and Welfare Controversies. Aldershot (Gran Bretaña): Ashgate, 2004.
8. Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary J. Gregor
and Jens Timmermann. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
9. Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.
10. Kant, Immanuel. The Philosophy of Law: An Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of
Jurisprudence as the Science of Right, by Immanuel Kant, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh:
Clark, 1887). http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/359.
11. Latimer, Jeff, Craig Dowden, and Danielle Muise. "The Effectiveness of Restorative
Justice Practices: A Meta-Analysis." The Prison Journal 85, no. 2 (2005): 127-44.
12. Weitekamp, Elmar, and Hans-Jürgen Kerner, eds. Restorative Justice Theoretical
Foundations. Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2002.

Silberstein 69

13. McCold, Paul, and Wachtel, Ted. “Restorative Justice theory validation.” in Weitekamp,
Kerner, 2002.
14. O’Connell, Eoin. "Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment, Suffering, and the Highest
Good." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 52, no. 4 (2014): 477-95.
15. Raye, Barbara, and Roberts, Ann. “Restorative processes.” in Johnstone, and Van Ness.
2011.
16. Sullivan, Dennis. Handbook of Restorative Justice: A Global Perspective. New York:
Routledge, 2008.
17. Walgrave, Lode. “From community to dominion: in search of social values for
restorative justice.” in Weitekamp, Kerner, 2002.
18. W., Van Ness Daniel, and Karen Heetderks Strong. Restoring Justice: An Introduction to
Restorative Justice. London: Routledge, 2015.
19. Zehr, Howard. “Journey to belonging,” in Weitekamp, Kerner, 2002.
20. Zehr, Howard. Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice. (Christian peace
shelf selection).Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1990. 27.
21. Zehr, Howard. The Little Book of Restorative Justice. Vancouver, B.C.: Langara College,
2016. 17

